

URBAN OPERATIONS

Lessons learned

TTPs



Purpose

To inform about recent lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures which are applicable to tactical level Urban Operations.

Agenda

- **Individual Tasks**
- **Maneuver and Intelligence**
- **Weapons and Ammunition**
- **Equipment**
- **Planning, Coordination, And Synchronization**
- **Battle Command**

Individual Tasks

(1 of 3)

- Technical advantage of U.S. Forces greatly reduced. Greater importance of training, motivation and unit cohesiveness.
- Close Quarters Combat techniques are sometimes preferred over the room clearing drill in FM 7-8. Soldiers need to know both techniques; leaders must know when to use one or the other.
- Combat Marksmanship skills require constant training: instinctive fire, partially-exposed and moving targets.
- Physical fitness and mental toughness give soldiers the will to win.

Individual Tasks

(2 of 3)

- GPS and photos are a must for urban navigation.
- Combat Lifesavers save lives - minimum of one per fire team – they free up medics to treat more serious casualties.
- Advanced demolition training to squad leader level.
- Snipers and designated marksmen can be used extensively with good results.
- Platoon Leaders must know how to designate targets and control Attack Helicopters.

Individual Tasks

(3 of 3)

- Reporting: Leaders must make the distinction between **hearing** fire and **receiving** fire.
- ROE and Law of Land Warfare must be clearly understood by leaders and soldiers and constantly reinforced.
- History, culture, and language classes acclimate Soldiers to the environment.
- Short range gunfights are the norm.
- Fire control and distribution—ammo conservation

Maneuver and Intelligence

(1 of 2)

- No substitute for realistic Maneuver Live Fire Exercises before combat.
- The AAR process works. When used consistently, unit performance continually improves.
- IPB is a constant process. Great terrain products, difficult to template enemy and develop Doctrinal Templates.
- For clearing buildings, units must be prepared for both precision and high intensity conditions (ROE) FM 3-06.11, p. 3-28
- Units Attack to Seize or Secure; not Cordon and Search.

Maneuver and Intelligence

(2 of 2)

- Units must have a plan for a measured escalation of forces (Combat & Multipliers)
- Heavy Forces must have local security.
- Night Operations worked to our advantage.
- Fast Rope capability is critical for UO air assault operations.
- PSYOPS, linguists, and CA are combat multipliers that require strict control.

Weapons and Ammunition

(1 of 2)

- Light Infantry needs mounted .50 Cal and Mk 19 in UO.
- M203 provides immediate and precise illumination.
- Concussion grenades are safer than fragmentation grenades when assaulting buildings and bunkers.
- M249 works well in the assault.

Weapons and Ammunition

(2 of 2)

- SIMRADS Night Sights effective for M21 sniper system.
- LAW not always an effective bunker buster. AT-4 works well; but size and weight make IMT difficult.
- Cayenne pepper spray and CS used to disperse crowds when lesser measures failed.
- Units should know non-lethal crowd control techniques.
- Barret .50 Cal sniper rifle is very effective.

Equipment

(1 of 2)

- Soldier loads of 40-50 lbs without rucksack.
- Tradeoffs on Level II vs Level III Body Armor: mobility vs survivability.
- M-16 add-ons help: PAQ-4B and Tacclites.
- AT Vehicles converted to Mk-19 or .50 Cal platforms. Gunners require additional protection.
- IR Covers for Bradley Service Drive.

Equipment

(2 of 2)

- BFV needs exterior mounted telephone integrated into vehicle intercom.
- Hand-held laser pointers needed by Infantry and Aviation units.
- Knee and elbow pads are a must.
- Radio headsets needed to keep hands free.
- HMMWV hardening kits required.
- Light Infantry requires transportation augmentation.

Planning, Coordination, & Synchronization

(1 of 3)

- Synchronization becomes different and more difficult when everything does not fit neatly into a BOS.
- External Coordination, Force Protection and Information Dissemination became additional BOSs during Operation Restore Hope.
- CSS Operations over extended LOCs impact on OPTEMPO.
- Defining the Commander's Intent often involves a dialogue between Higher and Lower.

Planning, Coordination, & Synchronization

(2 of 3)

- Providing Company Commanders with missions having a Doctrinal Task and Purpose reduces confusion.
- QRF Operations: Difficult to reduce response time to less than 30 minutes even when the unit is ready to roll. Estimate, Decision, Coordination, and Dissemination must occur prior to action and it all takes time.

Planning, Coordination, & Synchronization

(3 of 3)

- Urban Operations are manpower intensive. They can become **casualty** intensive.
- CASEVAC and resupply operations should be planned like combat operations.
- QRF Operations: Difficult to reduce response time to less than 30 minutes even when the unit is ready to roll. Estimate, Decision, Coordination, and Dissemination must occur prior to action and it all takes time.

Battle Command

(1 of 2)

- Mission facilitates deploying the Bn Tac CP well forward. Physical presence and personal actions of the Bn CDR weigh heavily.
- Biggest impediment to C2 is noise: Incoming and outgoing. Extensive Live Fire Exercises in training acclimatize all to these conditions
- Do not rely solely on radio reports. Listen to the Battle
- Stay cool and clear-headed. Think Action-Reaction - Counteraction. Give subordinates reassurance

Battle Command

(2 of 2)

- Commanders must practice patience: Let junior leaders develop the situation. The Battalion Commander cannot control everything. Don't try.
- No knee-jerk decisions when soldiers are killed or wounded. Haste leads to needless waste.
- Give subordinates time and space to develop the situation. Waiting is the hardest part.
- Remember the Regiment. Do not stain the Colors.

CONCLUSIONS

(1 of 2)

- URBANIZATION IS A CONDITION OF THE TERRAIN, BUT THE TERRAIN CHANGES DURING A FIGHT.
- OCCUPANTS OF THE CITY CAN HAVE MORE INFLUENCE ON MOUT THAN EVEN THE TERRAIN DOES.
- US JOINT FORCES MUST ALWAYS BE READY TO FIGHT ON URBAN TERRAIN, AT ANY AND ALL LEVELS OF VIOLENCE.
- URBAN FIGHTING CAN BE VIOLENT, DEADLY, CLOSE, AND PERSONAL FOR ALL INVOLVED, FRIENDLY, ENEMY, AND NONCOMBATANT.

CONCLUSIONS

(2 of 2)

- Likelihood of conducting urban ops is greater.
- Urban ops more complicated... full spectrum ops...transitions.
- Must leverage doctrine w/ new technologies... non-lethal...C2 INFOSYST and ISR.
- Home station facilities... required to train the force.
- Urban combat will continue to be a close, tough fight.
- It's an environment, not a mission.



THOUGHTS ON UO

**IT'S A
DECENTRALIZED
FIGHT....**



**.... IT REQUIRES
A COMBINED
ARMS TEAM**

Questions?